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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Third District 
court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which upheld 
the sentence imposed by the Salt Lake City Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On August 4, 1975, appellant was sentenced by the 
Honorable Robert c. Gibson for violating Sec. 41-6-44, Utah 
Code Anno. after appellant had pled guilty to the charge of 
driving while intoxicated. Appellant was fined $200 and given a 
suspenced sentence. 
On March 15, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the 
District Court of Salt Lake County seeking a determination that 
the Salt Lake City Court lacked jurisdiction to have heard appel-
lant's case. On May 24, 1977,the parties having stipulated to 
the facts, the District Court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary pre-
siding, determined that since appellant pled guilty to the charge, 
appellant consented to the Cour~s in personam jurisdiction and 
upheld the City Court's sentence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a determination that the Salt Lake City 
Court lacked jurisdiction to try appellant and accept appellant's 
guilty plea, and further, to have appellant's record expunged and 
the amount paid as fine returned to him. 
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STATEME~T OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the facts as they appear o 
the police record of arrest (R. p. 6), and which is an exhibit 
before the Court. Appellant does not alter that position here 
DOES A PLEA OF GUILTY WAIVE ALL DEFENSES SUCH 
THAT THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION IS 
DENIED TO APPELLANT AT TIME OF SENTENCING OR 
ON COLLATERAL ATTACK OF SUCH PLEA? 
The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to: 
cuss this issue several times: Brady v. United States, 397 u.~ 
742; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; Parker v. North Caro: ti 
397 u.s. 790; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 u.s. 258; Blackledge v. cc 
~, 417 U.S. 21; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975). St 
If'. each case the Supreme Court reiterated the judicio t: 
created rule that a guilty plea waives all defenses except tho: 
which are jurisdictional in nature. Unless a jurisdictional de p 
fense is available to defendant, he may only rely on "a federal o 
habeas corpus proceeding to attacks on the voluntary and intell A 
gent nature of the guilty plea," Blackledge, ~, 417 U.S. at F 
p. 30. 
In the Blackledge, supra, case, the Court found it 
necessary to explain what might fall within the meaning of the 
word "jurisdictional." 
Although the underlying claims presented 
in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of con-
stitutional dimensions, none went to the very 
power of the State to bring the defendant into 
court to answer the charge brought against him. 
The defendants in McMann v. Richardson, for ex-
ample, could surely have been brought to trial 
- 2 -
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without the use of the allegedly coerced con-
fessions and even a tainted indictment of the 
sort alleged in Tollett could have been "cured" 
through a new indictment by a properly selected 
grand jury. In the case at hand, by contrast, 
the nature of the underlying constitutional in-
firmity is markedly different •... Unlike the de-
fendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of 
"antecedent constitutional violations" or of a 
"deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 
prior to the entry of the guilty plea." .•.. Rather, 
the right that he asserts and that we today accept 
is the right not to be haled into court at all upon 
the felony charge. The very initiation of the pro-
ceedings against him in the Superior Court thus 
operated to deny him due process of law." 
As the above quotes clearly indicate, it is a viola-
tion of due process to "hale a defendant into court" under 
color of State authority when it is against the law to do so. 
Such a violation of due process rights is, in fact, a jurisdic-
tional defense for purposes of relief from a guilty plea. 
Turning now to the facts in this case as stated in the 
police exhibits before the Court, it is clear that the University 
of Campus Police effecting the arrest did so under color of State 
Authority when, in fact, the Campus Police had no such authority. 
Appellant is mindful of this Court's holding in Utah v. Cornish, 
Case Nos. 14824 and 14825 (1977). In Cornish, the Campus Police 
were acting under the direction of a special deputy of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Department and were, therefore, held to be 
acting within their jurisdiction. No such authority exists in 
this case. Neither appellant nor the State has even attempted 
to submit to the Court any chain of authority as existed in Cornish. 
- 3 -
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What does appear in this case are facts similar to I 
Hurley, 28 Ut. 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972). The Campus Police 
here as in Hurley, acted on property located off the campus. 
activity in both cases did not involve "exigent circumstances 1 c 
the direct and immediate interests of the institution concernit 
its property students or employees" was involved. Hurley, 28 1 
2d at 248. Under these circumstances, the Campus Police do not 
fall within the ambit of 53-45-5, Utah Code Anno., 1953. ConsE 
quently, appellant was arrested by police without State Authori ' 
No citizen's arrest is intended or imolied based on after-arres 
conduct, i.e, advise of rights, request to submit to chemical 
test, and booking in jail without seeking assistance from any 
other law enforcement agency. In this particular instance, hm 
ever, the State claims a valid arrest not because the arrest wa 
properly carried out, but because appellant pled guilty. The 
State's position is untenable in the face of Blackledge. 
Appellant contends that it is a violation of due proc 
for the Campus Police acting under that authority to arrest app 
lant when it has no police power to do so. The State has not a 
orized the arrest of appellant by Campus Police under these cir 
cumstances. In effect, the State has "haled" appellant into co 
when it had no right to do so. It is precisely the factual and 
legal situation that existed in Blackledge, supra, that exists 
here. Appellant submits to the Court that Blackledge, supra, 
- 4 -
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and Menna, supra, as the Supreme Law of the Land are controlling 
in this case. 
Appellant cannot consent to the subject matter juris-
' diction of a court. It is an established principle of law that 
[ 1 the parties together, even with the court's approval, cannot con-
sent to subject matter jurisdiction where none exists, Rule 12(h), 
)j Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Hardy v. Meadows, 71 Ut. 255, 
;E 264 P. 268. The lower court's finding that that a plea of guilty 
:i granted in personam jurisdiction (R. 9) ignores the issues. The 
" point is that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction not in 
personam jurisdiction because it had no right to hear a case the 
State was precluded by law from bringing in the first place. The 
'' State had no right to arrest appellant for this crime under these 
'' circumstances or by the particular officers involved in this case. 
The State had no right to arrest because the violation was a mis-
demeanor and no duly authorized person was present observing the 
,c alleged drunken driving. The State had no right to arrest by these 
p officers because they were not police officers of the State and 
were acting outside their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, appellant requests this Court find that absent 
jurisdiction over the subject matter at the time of arrest by 
d University Campus Police, acting as such, deprived the original 
trial court of power to hear the case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's guilty plea does not waive jurisdictiona: 
defenses, and the State's violation of due process by arrestin1 
appellant when not authorized by law to do so denied the Salt : 
City Court jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellant, therefor1 
submits to the Court that under authority of Cornish, supra; ~ 
Hurley, supra; Blackledge, supra, and Henna, supra, the Distrit 
Court's judgment should be reversed and appellant's fine retun 
and record expunged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Roqert M. McRae 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, 
postage prepaid, September 27 , 1977, to Attorney General of 
Utah, Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Robert M. McRae 
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